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Abstract
In this paper we characterize the optimal allocation mechanism for N objects, (permits),
to I potential buyers, (￿rms). Firms￿payo⁄s depend on their costs, the costs of competitors
and on the ￿nal allocation of the permits, allowing for externalities, substitutabilities and com-
plementarities. Firms￿cost parameter is private information and is independently distributed
across ￿rms. Due to fact that there are multiple objects to be allocated and buyers valuations
are non-linear the problem fails to be "regular," even if the monotone hazard rate property
is satis￿ed. Moreover the standard ironing technique does not apply. Our ￿rst insight is to
develop a new method to solve for the optimal mechanism for the "general case." In this case
the optimal mechanism may require randomization between allocations. Externalities in our
model are type dependent. This has two consequences: ￿rst, even though the private infor-
mation of each ￿rm is one dimensional (its cost), an allocation￿ s virtual valuation depends on
the cost parameters of all ￿rms. Second, the ￿critical￿ type of each buyer, (the type for which
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1participation constraint binds) is not exogenously given but depends on the particular mech-
anism selected. Our model captures key features of many important multi-object allocation
problems like the allocation of time slots for TV commercials, landing slots in airports, pri-
vatization and ￿rm takeovers. Keywords: Optimal Auctions, Multiple Objects, Externalities,
Mechanism Design‘. JEL D44, C7, C72.
1 Introduction
In this paper we characterize the optimal allocation mechanism for N objects (permits), to I
potential buyers (￿rms). Firms￿payo⁄s depend on their costs, the costs of competitors and on the
￿nal allocation of the permits, allowing for externalities, substitutabilities and complementarities. A
￿rm cares not only whether it obtains a particular set of permits, but also cases about who obtained
which licence. Firms￿cost parameter is private information and is independently distributed across
￿rms. Externalities are type dependent.
The model of this paper can be thought as follows: There is a revenue-maximizing seller 1(the
government) trying to sell permits for operating in a certain market to some potential buyers. These
permits represent a right to participate in the market. The pro￿ts of a given ￿rm depend on three
things: its own marginal cost, which is private information, the market structure and the marginal
costs of the competitors that also participate in the market. After the permits have been allocated,
the ￿rms that got one or more of them face a perfectly anticipated demand and engage in some
sort of oligopolistic competition. We can also allow for the possibility that these ￿rms are already
competing in di⁄erent markets, so even if they do not get permits assigned, who gets the permits
will a⁄ect their pro￿ts. The presence of such externalities allows the seller to extract extra payments
from any given ￿rm, just by threatening to setup a very damaging market structure in case it does
not participate in the process
In a large variety of multi-object allocation problems the presence of externalities is of central
role. Our model with small modi￿cations can help address the following problems.
1The objective function can be modi￿ed to take into account the possibility that the government cares also for
consumer surplus.
2￿ Firm Take-overs: Externalities are of huge importance in ￿rm take-overs: Recently (Febru-
ary 2004), Cingular bought AT&T wireless for $41 billion after a bidding war with Vodafone. Some
perceive that the big winner of this sale will be Verizon even though it was not a participant in the
auction (NY Times February 17, 2004 ￿Verizon Wireless May Bene￿t From Results of Auction￿ ).
￿ Allocation of Airport Take-O⁄ and Landing Slots. Airport take-o⁄ and landing slots
are a scarce resource yet not priced! There are important externalities since for instance if two
airlines are ￿erce competitors in a big airport say United and American at O￿ Hare, then if United
obtains critical landing slots in LAX, (Los Angeles International Airport), this may well a⁄ect its
market position in O￿ Hare vis-a-vis American.
￿ Auctioning of time slots for advertisements on TV, radio. In reality airtime for
advertisements is priced using conventional mechanisms, whereas if networks take-into account the
presence of externalities and auction-o⁄the time slots, we might end up with less (even zero) airtime
of advertisement yet higher revenue. How much would a ￿rm pay so that its ￿ercest competitor does
not advertise in the intermission of Super-ball? One can imagine a network asking this question to
Miller, Budweiser, Bud etc. Taking this to an extreme there may be a potential for a lot of revenue
with actually no one airing a spot. In other words strongly opposed interests may permit the seller
to extract payments just for doing nothing !2
￿ Privatization - Mechanism Design with Endogenous Market Structure. . Our model
captures such scenarios and generalizes previous work by Dana and Spier (1994), who examine
whether the government should sell a ￿rm in one piece or cut it into two, (for a discussion on this,
see Milgorm (1996)).3 In the work of Dana and Spier (1994) the outcome of the mechanism depends
heavily on the weight that the government assigns to revenue versus e¢ ciency and on the type of
competition that prevails in the market after privatization.
￿ Selling licences for cellular networks, TV or radio broadcasting.
￿ Optimal Bundling: Since we allow for complementarities and substitutability one can think
2This is similar to the common agency problem, as identi￿ed for example in Dixit (1997).
3Gale (1991) also considers a variation of this problem but because he imposes a very strong super-additivity
condition to the pro￿t function, he shows that an optimal mechanism always gives all the ￿permits￿to at most one
buyer, so the market structure is always the one of a monopoly.
3of applications for cases of bundling of goods, (bundles like telecommunication services - internet -
cable TV, computers-printers-software-digital cameras etc).
This paper is related to the optimal auction literature for multiple objects and to the literature of
mechanism design with externalities. Maskin and Riley (1989) analyze the case of single dimensional
private information and continuously divisible goods, Armstrong (2000) allows for multidimensional
uncertainty but there are only two buyers and two types. Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti, (JMS)
(1996) study optimal auction design in the presence of externalities in a single unit environment
where externalities are type independent.4 Because of the presence of externalities the seller can
extract payment for the losers but the revenue maximizing allocation of the object is the same
as in the case of the revenue maximizing auction without taking into account the presence of
externalities. JMS (2001) consider again the design of optimal auctions of a single object in the
presence of externalities. Here the externalities are type dependent: the type of each buyer is
a vector of numbers that determines his/her utility as a function of who gets the object. The
multi-dimensionality makes the solution of the general problem intractable: it is almost impossible
to verify that the set of conditions that are implied by incentive compatibility are satis￿ed (the
allocation rule has to be monotonic and conservative - or path independent).
Our innovation is to allow for multiple objects, general payo⁄ functions that allow for com-
plementarities and substitutabilities and type dependent externalities among buyers, but because
private information is single-dimensional we can solve the problem. Due to fact that there are mul-
tiple objects to be allocated and buyers valuations are non-linear the problem fails to be "regular,"
even if the monotone hazard rate property is satis￿ed. Moreover the standard ironing technique
does not apply. Our ￿rst insight is to develop a new method to solve for the optimal mechanism
for the "general case." In this case the optimal mechanism may require randomization between
allocations. Second, even though the private information of each ￿rm is one dimensional (its cost),
an allocation￿ s virtual valuation depends on the cost parameters of all other ￿rms. This captures
nicely the existence of externalities among buyers: how much money the seller can extract from
￿rm A depends on the technology of ￿rm B, which captures together with other parameters how
4General models allowing for type dependent externalities like those of Jehiel-Moldovanu (2001), and Krishna and
Perry (2001) are concerned with the design of e¢ cient mechanisms.
4strong of a competitor ￿rm B is. As in JMS (1996) and JMS (2001) the critical type, (where the
participation constraint binds), of the buyer is not exogenously given but depends on the range of
the externalities. But unlike JMS (1996) and (2001) in our approach since we allow for more general
payo⁄ functions, the critical type also depends on the actual mechanism. This critical type of each
agent determines how much money the seller can extract from the players. Hence the characteriza-
tion of the optimum becomes intricate: given a mechanism there is a vector of critical types and a
amount of payments that the seller can extract from the buyers: the mechanism depends not only
on the virtual valuations, but also on which is the critical type. Moreover the vector of critical types
is mechanism speci￿c. A consequence of this interrelationship between the critical types and the
mechanism is that the optimal allocation of the object in the presence of externalities is di⁄erent
from the one we would obtain with no externalities. In contrast, the presence of externalities in JMS
(1996) a⁄ects only the payment that the seller can extract from the buyers and not the allocation
of the object.
To summarize, the two main insights of our analysis are
1) With Non-Linear valuations the optimal mechanism may randomize between allocations: a
new method to obtain the optimal mechanism.
2) With type-dependent externalities "punishments" depend on the allocation that the seller
wants to implement: we still obtain revenue equivalence - but now revenue is not any more a linear
function of the allocation.
2 The model
A seller owns N indivisible objects that are of 0 value to her and faces I risk-neutral buyers. Both
N and I are ￿nite natural numbers. The seller, (indexed by zero), can bundle these N objects in
any way she sees ￿t. An allocation z = (z0;z1;::::;zI) is an assignment of objects to the buyers
and to the seller. The set of possible allocations is given by Z ￿ [I [ f0g]N and hence Z is ￿nite.
Buyer i￿ s valuation of allocation z is ￿i(z;ci;c￿i); which is indexed by i0s type ci and by the types
of all the other buyers c￿i: Buyer i0s type ci is distributed on Ci = [ci;ci]; with 0 ￿ ci ￿ ci < 1
according to a distribution Fi that has has a strictly positive and continuous fi. All buyers￿types
5are independently distributed. We use
f￿i(c￿i) = f1(c1) ￿ f2(c2):::fi￿1(ci￿1) ￿ fi+1(ci+1):::fI(cI)
and
f(c) = f1(c1):::fI(cI); where c 2 C = C1 ￿ C2 ￿ :: ￿ CI:
We assume that5
￿i is decreasing and convex in ci
￿i(z;￿;c￿i) is di⁄erentiable for all z and c￿i:
This speci￿cation makes clear that we are in the context of an auction with externalities, since
each buyer cares not only for the objects that are assigned to him, but also for the allocation of
the remaining ones. Notice also that we allow ￿i(z;ci;c￿i) 6= 0 even when the allocation z does
not include any objects for i, so we can include the cases when the bidders are ￿rms competing in
a di⁄erent markets, and whatever happens in the current sale one will a⁄ect their positioning and
interaction relative to the other buyers, which will in turn a⁄ect their payo⁄s.
3 Characterization of Feasible Mechanisms
By the revelation principle we know that we can restrict attention to direct revelation mechanisms.
A direct revelation mechanism M = (p;x) consists of an assignment rule p : C ￿! ￿(Z) and
a payment rule C ￿! RI.
The assignment rule speci￿es the probability of each allocation for a given a vector of messages.
We denote by pz(c) the probability that allocation z is implemented when the message tuple is
c. The payment speci￿es a vector of expected payments given a vector of reports. For a ￿xed
5Gale￿ s (1990) condition on pro￿t function, would in our notation read as follows:







where @Z = fz 2 Zj(9i 2 f1;:::;Ig)zi = Ng.

























where ￿i 2 ￿(Z) is the (possibly random) allocation that the seller employs if i refuses to participate.
The role of these "punishment allocations" will be discussed in the section that follows.
We say that a mechanism (p;x) is feasible i⁄
Ui(ci;ci;(p;x)) ￿ Ui(ci;c
0
i;(p;x)) for all ci;c
0
i 2 Ci





z(c) ￿ 0 for all c 2 C
The ￿rst set of constraints are the incentive compatibility constraints, the second set of constraints
are the voluntary participation constraints and the third set of constraints impose the requirements
that probabilities sum up to one and are non-negative numbers. Then the problem of a revenue



















7This the expected "marginal cost" of allocation z: If ￿i were increasing in ci we could then call
Pi the expected marginal value of allocation z: The analog of Pi in Myerson (1981) is Pi(ci) =
R
C￿i
p(ci;c￿i)f￿i(c￿i)dc￿i since there is only one object and
@￿i(z;ci;c￿i)
@ci = 1.















We are now ready to investigate properties of feasible mechanisms.
Lemma 1. A mechanism (p;x) is feasible i⁄
Pi(c0
i) ￿ Pi(ci) for all c
0
i > ci (1)
Vi(ci) = Vi(ci) ￿
ci R
ci
Pi(s)ds for all ci 2 Ci (2)





z(c) ￿ 1 (4)
Proof. By the convexity of ￿i(z;￿;c￿i) we have V is a maximum of convex functions, so it is convex,
and therefore di⁄erentiable a.e. It￿ s also easy to check that the following are equivalent:
(a) (p;x) is incentive compatible
(b) Pi(ci) 2 @V (ci)
(c) U(ci;ci;(p;x)) = V (ci)
(=)) Since the mechanism is incentive compatible, from the previous characterization we get
that a feasible mechanism must satisfy (b). A result in Krishna and Maenner (1998) then implies






This immediately implies (1). Finally, individual rationality is the same as (3).
((=)Individual rationality is the same as (3). To prove incentive compatibility it￿ s enough to show
8that Pi(ci) 2 @Vi(ci). By (1) and (2),
V (c
0








which shows Pi(ci) 2 @Vi(ci).










































































>From the last expression the result follows.
94 Analysis of the Problem
In the environment under consideration, each buyer potentially cares about the ultimate allocation
of objects even if no objects are assigned to him. The seller can take advantage of the presence
of these external e⁄ects and extract higher payments by arti￿cially creating unfavorable outside
options. For example, consider the auction for licences of nth generation mobile services. Firms
bidding in this auction may also operate in the market for the provision of internet services. The
seller knows, and can take advantage of, the fact that if one ￿rm does not participate in the auction
for the licences, it will be for sure be left out of that market, and it will lose market share in the
market of high speed internet connections. This idea appeared for the ￿rst time in a mechanism
design problem in JMS (1996) and (2001). The mechanism designer has, is some loose sense, the
power to impose outside options.
We denoted by Zi ￿ Z denote the subset of allocations that the seller can employ to threaten buyer
i 6. Let ￿i denote a probability distribution over elements of Zi, then the seller can then threaten
buyer i that he will implement ￿i if he/she decides not to participate. Put it di⁄erently ￿i 2 ￿(Zi)
speci￿es the probability of each allocation when ￿rm i decides not to participate in the auction.
This is the threat allocation rule: because there are externalities the seller can threat i that in the









which as we will explain later determines Vi(￿ ci) in (5).
As a side note, we must say that we are making a very strong assumption about the commitment
ability of the seller. His threat of choosing a particular allocation in case agent i does not participate
is credible only under this assumption. To see how important this is, and a possible approach when
6We will assume that Zi ￿ fz 2 Zjzj 6= i for all j 2 f1;:::;Ngg, so the seller cannot force the agent to get some
objects
10one removes this assumption, see subsection 5.5.
In general the payo⁄ at the outside option, that is Ui(ci;￿i), will depend on ci. This interdepen-
dency will make the characterization of the optimal punishment complicated: these punishments
f￿igi2I will depend on the particular assignment function p that the seller wants to implement.
Apart from this complication the problem under consideration has complications that arise from
the fact that there are multiple objects for sale and from the fact that valuations are non-linear. In
order to address these complications one at a time we will deal with three cases separately.
In subsection 4.1 we consider the (simpler) cases where, for any threat rule ￿i, the payo⁄ of buyer
i from non-participation does not depend on his type ci, that is
Ui(ci;￿i) = Ui(￿i) for all ci 2 Ci:
From an economic point of view, we can consider these cases as the ones where the externality is
created by the interaction in a di⁄erent market, so it does not depend on the realization of the cost
parameter for this particular one. Imagine, for example, the case of ￿rms that already compete in
the provision of internet services, and are bidding for permits in the telecom business.
In subsection 4.2 we consider the cases where the payo⁄of buyer i from non-participation, Ui(ci;￿i),
can indeed depend on his type ci. A good example for this environment is the case of advertising.
The externality su⁄ered by a candidate because his competitor gets to air a spot depends on his
strength.
4.1 The Optimal Mechanism with Type-Independent ￿Threats￿
As we said before, we consider the cases where the payo⁄ of buyer i from non-participation does
not depend on his type ci. More rigorously we have:
￿i(z;ci;c￿i) = ￿i(z;c￿i) for all z 2 Zi
The key consequence is that the optimal threat that the seller employs will be independent of
the particular allocation rule p that he wants to implement. This will allow us to separate the
11optimization problem in two.
Step 1: Determination of the Optimal Punishments
In the case under consideration, where buyer i￿ s payo⁄ from a punishment allocation does not
depend on i￿ s type, we can determine f￿igi2I independently of fp;xg. Remembering that Zi ￿ Z
is the set of allocations that the seller can use to punish buyer i we have the following lemma.
Lemma 3. The optimal punishments f￿igi2I are given by
￿
zi















which is by assumption independent of ci: By the de￿nition of zi this is the worst possible outside
option that the seller can induce for buyer i.
Step 2: Determination of the Optimal Allocation Rule
Next we describe a simple program whose solution gives an optimal feasible mechanism. Before we
do this we need to de￿ne the counterpart of virtual valuation for the allocation problem that we
are considering here.











1)In Myerson (1981) the concept of virtual valuation is buyer-speci￿c. Letting vi denote buyer i￿ s
valuation of the object, it is given by




122)In the current problem the concept of virtual valuation is allocation speci￿c, and since an alloca-
tion may a⁄ect all the buyers we have to sum over all buyer￿ s virtual valuations from allocation z.
3) The total virtual valuation of allocation z depends on the whole vector of types.






















z(s;c￿i)ds ￿ Vi(￿ ci);
and












then the mechanism is optimal.
Proof. This result follows immediately from lemmas 2 and 3.
Proposition 4.1 describes a program whose solution gives us an optimal mechanism. The solution









also satis￿es (1). This is so because the relaxed program can be solved by pointwise maximization.
Following Myerson (1981) we will refer to this case as the regular case.






















A su¢ cient condition for Assumption 4.1 to hold is












Even more stringent than this is









k < l and c 2 C.
The Proposition that follows describes the solution to the seller￿ s problem if pointwise maximization
of the relaxed problem (6) leads to a feasible allocation.







1 if z￿ 2 arg max
z Jz(c)
0 otherwise
Proof. The solution proposed corresponds to pointwise maximization, so the only possibility that











7In the case of no externalities, this condition is implied by Jz(ci) decreasing in ci, which is the equivalent to the
regularity condition in Myerson (1981).
8In their particular framework, this is the assumption made in Dana and Spier (1994).
15and consider a ￿xed c￿i. In a region [c;c] where z 2 arg max
z2Z
Jz(c) p(ci;c￿i) does not change











￿;c￿i) = 1 and pz2(c￿
i
+;c￿i) = 1, so Pi(ci) is
nondecreasing because of Assumption 4.1.
In the problem considered in Myerson (1981), a su¢ cient condition for the problem to be regular is
that the virtual valuations are increasing. For example, if the distribution Fi satis￿es that
1￿Fi(ci)
fi(ci)
is increasing (called the monotone hazard rate property,(MHR)) then the problem is regular. For
the cases where the monotonicity of the virtual valuations fails, Myerson introduced an arti￿cial
program replacing virtual valuations with ￿ironed￿ones (made monotonic in a ￿clever￿way), and
established that the solution of this arti￿cial problem solves the original one.
Some remarks are in place
1) Myerson￿ s ironing technique does not work here: even if virtual valuations are monotonic (de-
creasing, in our case), the assignment function obtained via pointwise optimization will in general
fail to satisfy (1).
2) The assumptions that guarantee that a problem is regular are quite stringent, as the example
that follows demonstrates.
Consider the case of the privatization of a public monopoly where the market structure can be
decided by the seller. There are 2 potential buyers, A and B, and 4 possible allocations Z =
fmonopoly A, monopoly B, duopoly, no saleg = fzA;zB;zAB;z0g The (constant) marginal cost of
each ￿rm is ci ￿ U[0;1]. We will assume that there is a demand function a￿q, where a > 1 (so that
production is always positive). If we consider the case when the ex-post competition is Cournot,
the valuations for buyers A and B are respectively given by:
16￿A(z0;cA;cB) = 0 ￿B(z0;cA;cB) = 0
￿A(zA;cA;cB) =
(a￿cA)2
4b ￿B(zA;cA;cB) = 0








In this very simple case, Assumption 4.1 is satis￿ed i⁄ a ￿ 8.















8cB ￿ 7cA ￿ a (10)
Notice that if a ￿ 7
6, 8 is satis￿ed for all cA;cB 2 [0;1], so 10 must also hold for all cA;cB 2 [0;1].
But this is true only for a ￿ 8. This immediately implies that the condition is not satis￿ed if
a 2 (7
6;8).
If a 2 [1; 7
6), then there exist cA;cB such that 32cB = 6a+25cA. Then for that realization, 10 must
hold, but we have:
8cB ￿ 7cA = 32cB ￿ 25cA ￿ 3cA
= 6a ￿ 3cA
= a + (5a ￿ 3cA)
So we need that 5a ￿ 3cA ￿ 0, but this implies cA ￿ 5
3a ￿ 5
3, which is impossible.
Finally to see that if a ￿ 8 the condition hold, we notice that in that case 10 is always satis￿ed.
17This example is in the same spirit as the ones in Section 3 in Dana and Spier (1994). There, they









true, which is equivalent to our assumption 4.19.
What can be done if the regularity condition is not satis￿ed? Recall that the purpose of the reg-
ularity condition is to guarantee that pointwise optimization of the objective function will lead to
a solution that satis￿es the feasibility requirements. For the cases where this fails, Myerson has
introduced the ￿ironing￿technique, that essentially smooths out virtual valuations into monotone
functions. This is done in a way that does not change the solution of the original problem. The
possibility of using this technique relies on the fact that payo⁄s are linear in the allocation and that
each agent cares only about one allocation (getting the object in that case).
When an agent cares about more than one allocation, and especially when one allocation a⁄ects
more than one player (externalities), monotonicity conditions are not enough (as shown in example
??). Also, when utilities are not linear in the type, we can have an allocation rule b p = 2 @￿(Z). For
a discussion about this, see section 6
4.2 The Optimal Mechanism with Type-Dependent ￿Threats￿
Here we consider the seller￿ s problem in the case the agents can be threatened with allocations that
have type-dependent e⁄ects upon them. So in this subsection we will remove assumption 4.1.




















i￿i(z;ci;c￿i)f￿i(c￿i)dc￿i for all ci 2 Ci
P
z2Z
pz(c) ￿ 1;pz(c) ￿ 0 for all c 2 C











@c1 is imposed even in those illustrative cases.
18Before we move on let us highlight in what respects this more general problem di⁄ers for the ones






















￿ Vi(￿ ci) (11)
In the standard problem without externalities, the worst that the seller can do to a buyer is not
to assign him the object, hence the worse that the seller can do is to enforce a payo⁄ of zero: the
payment function is then given by (11), where Vi(￿ ci) is determined by the fact that the buyer always
has the option not to participate which implies that
Vi(￿ ci) = 0 (12)
In the case of type-independent externalities, analyzed in the previous section, the only di⁄erence
is that
Vi(￿ ci) = Ui(￿
zi
i ) (13)
This is essentially the same as the role of punishments as examined in JHM (1996).
Notice that the threat is independent of the mechanism, that is of the assignment function p, and
the payment function x. Moreover, the ￿critical type￿is always ￿ ci, so it￿ s enough to check the
participation constraint at ￿ ci. This won￿ t be the case when the externalities are type-dependent.
The Determination of Punishments in the General Case
In the general case both the ￿optimal threat￿and the ￿critical type￿depend on the allocation rule
that the seller wants to implement. Let￿ s see how they are determined and how they depend on the
allocation rule p.
A given allocation rule p determines up to a constant the expected payo⁄ for each type of a buyer,
19which is given by the familiar expression














At an optimal mechanism the constant Vi(￿ ci) is determined by the optimal threat that the seller
can design. Let us call ^ V (ci) the payo⁄ of type ci of buyer i net of the constant that is














which is, as we have shown, a decreasing and convex function of ci. Now for each such expression
there exists a ￿worst punishment￿which is identi￿ed in two steps.
Step 1: Determination of the Critical Type c￿
i(p;￿i)
For each assignment function p (which determines ^ Vi(ci)) and threat rule ￿i 2 ￿(Zi), there exists a
critical type c￿










The seller is contemplating what would be the largest constant that he could reduce i
0s payo⁄given
a proposed allocation p and a threat rule ￿i: this constant is going to be determined by the type
where ^ Vi would hit ￿i ￿rst if we were to shift it down, we call this type c￿
i(p;￿i): Formally c￿
i(p;￿i)






^ Vi(ci) ￿ ￿i(ci;￿i)
i
(14)
The constant by which the seller can reduce i￿ s payo⁄ is given by the di⁄erence
^ Vi(c
￿






The computation of ci*(p,z)
) , ( i i i c U r
Given the convexity of V (￿) and ￿i(￿;￿i), the Problem described in (14) can be written as:
c
￿




^ Vi(ci) ￿ ￿i(ci;￿i)
i
:
This characterization, even if it looks more di¢ cult, is extremely useful when the expected payo⁄
functions ￿i(￿;￿i) are linear, since the set of types where ￿i(ci;￿i) 2 @Vi(ci) is a singleton. Suppose







c if Pi(c) ￿ a￿i




After ￿nding the critical type for a particular threat rule ￿i, we can compute the value of Vi(ci) , since













Step 2: Determination of the optimal punishments ￿i














As we remarked before, the fact that the optimal punishment depends on the allocation rule p that
the seller has in mind is a big di⁄erence with the previous literature. The next example illustrates
that.
Suppose that Zi = fzA;zBg, the allocation rules p1 and p2 generate ^ Vi(ci;p1) = 1 ￿ 10ci and
^ V 2
i (ci;p2) = 0 respectively in Ci = [0;1], and
￿i(zA;ci) = 1 ￿ 10ci
￿i(zB;ci) = 0






22so ￿(p1) = ￿A and ￿(p1) = ￿B.
Notice that ￿￿
i does not necessarily lie in @￿(Zi), as shown by the next example:
Suppose that Zi = fzA;zBg, the allocation rule p generates ^ Vi(ci) = 1 ￿ ci in Ci = [0;1] and





i = 1 =) c￿
i = 0 and Vi(1) = 0
￿
zB
i = 1 =) c￿




i = 0:1 and ￿
zB
i = 0:9 =) c￿
i 2 [0;1] and Vi(1) = ￿ 9
10
Step 3: The Optimization Problem
From the previous steps, we see that the payments that can be extracted from the buyers can be











Contrast this expression with (12) and (13) notice that in this case Vi(ci) depends on p.
The previous results allow us to fully characterize the problem in terms of the assignment function
p:








































^ Vi(ci;p) ￿ ￿i(ci;￿i)
i
and ￿i(p) satis￿es






















z(s;c￿i)fi(s)ds ￿ Vi(￿ ci; b p)
and b ￿i satis￿es









then the mechanism is optimal.
This program is not linear in p anymore, as we illustrate with an example in section 5, so the usual
approach of pointwise maximization fails. Fortunately the problem has enough structure10to allow
the use of variational methods without imposing additional restrictions on the mechanism (such as
di⁄erentiability).
A simpler characterization can be found if the externalities are big, as we show in the next part.
The Optimal Mechanism in the Case of Large Externalities
10In particular enough di⁄erentiability on ￿i will guarantee enough regularity on c￿(p;￿i) as a function of the
mechanism.
24Suppose that the externalities are ￿big￿ in the following sense: for each i, there exists an
allocation z￿











i;ci) ￿ ￿i(z;ci) for all z 2 Z
Suppose assumption 4.2 is satis￿ed. Then individual rationality for agent i has to be veri￿ed
only at c￿





















pz(c) ￿ 1 and p(c) ￿ 0
Proof. First we prove that under assumption 4.2, if individual rationality is satis￿ed for ci = ci then
it is satis￿ed for all ci 2 Ci. It￿ s clear that under assumption 4.2 the optimal punishment for agent
i is given by the threat rule b ￿i(z￿


























the fact that V (ci) ￿ ￿(z￿
i;ci) implies that V (ci) ￿ ￿(z￿
i;ci) for all ci 2 Ci.




















25Now, knowing that c￿




























































Since the last term does not depend on p the result follows.
Exactly as in subsection 4.1, the solution to this problem can be divided in two broad categories: the
regular case (when pointwise maximization gives a feasible solution) and the non-regular one. The
assumptions that guarantee regularity are analogous, only with slightly changed virtual valuations.
As a simple corollary to the previous proposition, we can see that the allocation rule chosen by the
seller is ine¢ cient for a di⁄erent reason than in the case of no externalities. Here, when compared
to the ex-post e¢ cient allocation rule, the seller allocates the objects ￿too much￿ . Let￿ s call b p the













Suppose that the allocation z0 = (0;:::;0) satis￿es that ￿i(z0;ci;c￿i) = 0 for all c 2 C. Then,
compared to the ex-post e¢ cient allocation rule, the solution to the seller￿ s problem assigns the
object too much, or more formally:
fc 2 Cjb p
z0(c) = 1g ￿ fc 2 Cjp
￿z0(c) = 1g






As an illustration of our previous analysis we present an example. Consider 2 ￿rms ￿ghting for a
single slot to advertise their products. The value of actually airing a spot depends on the actual
cost parameter ci of the ￿rm, which is private information. The cost is uniformly and independently
distributed in [0;1]. We denote by z = 0 the allocation when the object is not sold and z = i the
allocation when the object is given to agent i.
5.1 No externalities
Suppose that ￿rms care only about getting the object. This case is one that can be just solved as
in Myerson (1981). For example, suppose that pro￿t functions for agent 1 are given by:
￿1(0;c1;c2) = 0
￿1(1;c1;c2) = 1 ￿ c1
￿1(2;c1;c2) = 0
and for agent 2 are given by:
￿2(0;c1;c2) = 0
￿2(1;c1;c2) = 0
￿2(2;c1;c2) = 1 ￿ c2










= 1 ￿ 2c1
J2(c1;c2) = 1 ￿ 2c2
J0(c1;c2) = 0
The solution is then given by:
p1(c) = 1 if c1 ￿ c2 and c1 ￿ 1
2
p2(c) = 1 if c1 ￿ c2 and c2 ￿ 1
2
0 otherwise
This assignment function is illustrated in ￿gure 2. The payments are given by
x1(c) =
(
1 ￿ maxfc2; 1





1 ￿ maxfc1; 1
2g if c2 ￿ minfc1; 1
2g
0 otherwise

























Since the problem is symmetric we get a total revenue R = 5
12
5.2 Type Independent Externalities
Now, let￿ s suppose that ￿rms also care about the competitor not getting the advertisement slot.
But suppose that a ￿rm￿ s payo⁄ if a competitor wins the auction is independent of that ￿rms￿own
28cost. For example, pro￿t functions for agent 1 are given by:
￿1(0;c1;c2) = 0
￿1(1;c1;c2) = 1 ￿ c1
￿1(2;c1;c2) = ￿￿
and for agent 2 are given by:
￿2(0;c1;c2) = 0
￿2(1;c1;c2) = ￿￿
￿2(2;c1;c2) = 1 ￿ c2
The virtual valuations are now
J1(c1;c2) = 1 ￿ 2c1 ￿ ￿
J2(c1;c2) = 1 ￿ 2c2 ￿ ￿
J0(c1;c2) = 0
And the optimal allocation is exactly the same as in the previous case, that is:
p1(c) = 1 if c1 ￿ c2 and c1 ￿ 1￿￿
2
p2(c) = 1 if c1 ￿ c2 and c2 ￿ 1￿￿
2
0 otherwise
Notice that now the seller keeps the object with a bigger probability, and he can also extract an
extra payment of ￿ from each bidder.
x1(c) =
(
1 ￿ maxfc2; 1￿￿





1 ￿ maxfc1; 1￿￿
2 g + ￿ if c2 ￿ minfc1; 1￿￿
2 g
0 otherwise







295.3 Type Dependent Externalities
Now, let￿ s suppose that ￿rms also care about the competitor not getting the advertisement slot.
Even more, the cost of a competitor winning the auction is higher when their own cost realization
is higher. For example, pro￿t functions for agent 1 are given by:
￿1(0;c1;c2) = 0
￿1(1;c1;c2) = 1 ￿ c1
￿1(2;c1;c2) = ￿￿c1
and for agent 2 are given by:
￿2(0;c1;c2) = 0
￿2(1;c1;c2) = ￿￿c2
￿2(2;c1;c2) = 1 ￿ c2










= 1 ￿ 2c1 ￿ 2￿c2
J2(c1;c2) = 1 ￿ 2c2 ￿ 2￿c1
J0(c1;c2) = 0







[p1(c)[1 ￿ 2c1 ￿ 2￿c2] + p2(c)[1 ￿ 2c2 ￿ 2￿c1]]dc1dc2 ￿ V1(1) ￿ V2(1)
s:t: ￿
R
[p1(c) + ￿p2(c)]dc2 is increasing
￿
R
[￿p1(c) + p2(c)]dc1 is increasing
p1(c) + p2(c) ￿ 1




The Critical Type: Large Externalities
i c a -
315.4 The Solution for the Case that Externalities are Large: ￿ > 1
This is the easy case to handle. Since the ￿threat allocation￿is linear (￿i(ci) = ￿￿ci) we know that
the critical type c￿





0 if P(0) ￿ ￿￿
1 if P(1) ￿ ￿
P ￿1(￿) otherwise
We can show now that independently of the allocation rule selected, the critical type for
each agent is always c￿
i = 0. Notice that P1(c1) =
1 R
0
[￿p1(c) ￿ ￿p2(c)]. Since p1(c) + p2(c) = 1 and
p1(c);p2(c) ￿ 0 we can conclude that P1(0) ￿ ￿￿, so c￿

































[p1(c)[1 ￿ 2c1 ￿ 2￿c2] + p2(c)[1 ￿ 2c2 ￿ 2￿c1]]dc1dc2 ￿ V1(1) ￿ V2(1)
s:t:
R
[p1(c)[￿1] + p2(c)[￿￿]]dc2 is nondecreasing
R
[p1(c)[￿￿] + p2(c)[￿1]]dc1 is nondecreasing
p1(c) + p2(c) ￿ 1







[p1(c)[2 + ￿ ￿ 2c1 ￿ 2￿c2] + p2(c)[2 + ￿ ￿ 2c2 ￿ 2￿c1]]dc1dc2
s:t:
R
[p1(c)[￿1] + p2(c)[￿￿]]dc2 is nondecreasing
R
[p1(c)[￿￿] + p2(c)[￿1]]dc1 is nondecreasing
p1(c) + p2(c) ￿ 1
Pointwise maximization gives us
p1(c) = 1 if 2 + ￿ ￿ 2c1 ￿ 2￿c2 ￿ 2 + ￿ ￿ 2c2 ￿ 2￿c1 and 2 + ￿ ￿ 2c1 ￿ 2￿c2 ￿ 0
p2(c) = 1 if 2 + ￿ ￿ 2c2 ￿ 2￿c1 ￿ 2 + ￿ ￿ 2c1 ￿ 2￿c2 and 2 + ￿ ￿ 2c2 ￿ 2￿c1 ￿ 0
0 otherwise
that can be rewritten as
p1(c) = 1 if c2 ￿ c1 and 2 + ￿ ￿ 2c1 ￿ 2￿c2 ￿ 0
p2(c) = 1 if c1 ￿ c2 and 2 + ￿ ￿ 2c2 ￿ 2￿c1 ￿ 0
0 otherwise
Feasibility is satis￿ed since for a ￿xed c2 the function c1 ￿! ￿p1(c1;c2)￿￿p2(c1;c2) is nondecreasing.
The same is true for a ￿xed c1 and the function c2 ￿! ￿￿p1(c1;c2) ￿ p2(c1;c2).
5.5 Sequentially Rational Punishments
Let￿ s consider again the case of section 4.1, but now let￿ s suppose that the seller does not have
commitment ability. Now he cannot get an extra payment of ￿ based on the threat of giving the
object to the other player, since it￿ s not credible. Now player i knows that in case he does not
participate, the seller will face a one bidder auction. In that case the virtual valuations would be
J￿i(c￿i) = 1 ￿ 2c￿i
J0(c￿i) = 0



















Example: Case of Large Externalities






Example: Case of Large Externalities







1 if c￿i ￿ 1
2
0 otherwise
and the imposed externality on agent i would be (in expectation) only of ￿
2. In that case, the extra
payment that the seller would be able to extract would be reduced by half and the total revenue








In the cases where pointwise optimization leads to a solution that is not feasible, we have to take
the feasibility constraints explicitly into account. Myerson (1981) presents a clever way of dealing
with this di¢ culty. He proposes a rewriting of the objective function in terms of ￿ironed￿virtual
valuations that has the advantage that pointwise maximization of this arti￿cial objective function
leads to a feasible solution and moreover the solution of this arti￿cial program solves the original
one as well. Unfortunately this beautiful technique does not work here where there is more then
one object, and payo⁄s are non-linear in the allocation.
In order to obtain the optimal allocation in this case without imposing regularity conditions we
should do a di⁄erent form of ironing. For simplicity let us ￿rst illustrate the technique in a special
environment where there is a single buyer.
There is a single agent and n + 1 allocations: z0;z1;::::;zn:





Now consider a point c￿ where
argmax
z Jz(c
￿￿) = zk and argmax
z Jz(c
￿+) = zl:
with k < l. Furthermore for simplicity assume that there is only one such point.
Our ￿rst result states that the problem for the seller is simple: it￿ s enough to ￿nd an optimal region
[x;x] where the feasibility constraint is satis￿ed with equality (that is Pi(c) is constant). Outside







One Buyer, Linear Valuations:
Regular Case
38Lemma 4. If fb pzigi2f0;:::;ng is a solution to the assignment problem, then there exist x;x satisfying














￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
c=x
for all c 2 [x;x]
b p
zk(x) = 1 if x > c
b p
zl(x) = 1 if x < c
Proof. Obvious




































￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
x
mk(x) = 1 if x > c
ml(x) = 1 if x < c
X
k￿i￿l
mi(c) = 1; mi(c) ￿ 0;






























mk(x) = 1 if x > c
ml(x) = 1 if x < c
X
k￿i￿l
mi(c) = 1; mi(c) ￿ 0
These problem can be decomposed. For each x and fmi(x)gl
i=k, ￿nding the optimal mixture at a
point c is a simple linear program. Even more, the next result allows us to decompose the problem
in two:
























ml(x) = 1 if x < c
X
k￿i￿l
mi(c) = 1; mi(c) ￿ 0
If the solution to this problem has x > c, then the solution to the original problem also has x > c.
Proof. See appendix
So we can solve ￿rst the problem constrained to a mixture with mk(x) = 1, if the solution is not a
corner (x > c) then we have a solution. If not, we just need to maximize over the optimal mixture
at c.
To illustrate some properties of the solution, let￿ s consider the case when l = k+1, so we are dealing
only with two allocations.






















+ (1 ￿ mk(c))
@￿(zl;c)
@c
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
x
mk(x) = 1 if x > c
ml(x) = 1 if x < c
0 ￿ mk(c) ￿ 1
































The second constraint imposes a condition on x whenever x < c. Using the expression for mk(c)
















￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
x
= 0
Then x(x) is de￿ned implicitly as the solution to the above equation as long as it is less or equal
than c, and as c otherwise. Notice that the convexity of ￿k;￿l immediately implies that x(x) is
nondecreasing.



























































































































￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
x
+ (1 ￿ mk(x))
@2￿l(c)
@c2







































f(c)dc is nondecreasing in x: the integrand is negative when



















































We illustrate this technique of obtaining the optimal allocation via a simple example.
Example: Suppose that there a single buyer whose cost parameter is private information and dis-
tributed on the interval [ 1
10; 2
5] according to F(c) = Mec2 and that there are two possible allocations,
z1 and z2: For each cost realization the payo⁄ arising from these two allocations is given by
￿(z1;c) = Bc
2 + Ac + K1
￿(z2;c) = Bc
2 + K2;








= 2Bc + A









so we can write
Jz2(c) = Bc















One Buyer, Non-linear Valuations
General Case: Ironing An Example
C*=0.2929
x c x =
Consider parameters A = 1;K1 = ￿2 and K2 = 0. In that case there is a unique change of sign of








For c = 0:1 we have that Jz1(c)￿Jz2(c) = 3:1 and for c = 0:4 we have that Jz1(c)￿Jz2(c) = ￿0:35.
So at c￿ = 0:2929 pointwise optimization would dictate that we should move from allocation 1 to
allocation 2 but this is not feasible since for all c we have Pz1 =
@￿(z1;c)














[1 ￿ m2(c)][J2(c) ￿ J1(c)]f(c)dc
s:t: (1 ￿ m2(c))(2Bc + A) + m2(c)2Bc = 2Bx + A
m2(x) = 1 if x < 0:4
0 ￿ m2(c) ￿ 1




; for c 2 [x; ￿ x) and
1 ￿ m2(c) =
A ￿ 2B(c ￿ x)
A
and from the second we get that for x < c it must be the case that
m2(￿ x) =











2B + x if A
2B + x ￿ c
c if not







[J1(c) ￿ J2(c)]f(c)dc +
Z x(x)
c￿
A ￿ 2B(c ￿ x)
A
[J2(c) ￿ J1(c)]f(c)dc




















45Let￿ s consider B = 1. In that case x(x) = 0:4. From previous work we know that
@R(x)
@x is
nondecreasing, and now we can ￿nd that
@R(x)
@x = 0 at x = 0:1928. From the previous equations we
can ￿nd the optimal mixture m2(c).
7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we study the optimal allocation mechanism for N objects (permits), to I potential
buyers (￿rms). Private information is single-dimensional and we can solve the problem even though
our environment in all other respects is very general. Payo⁄ functions allow for complementarities,
substitutabilities and type dependent externalities among buyers. The presence of type-dependent
externalities implies that even though the private information of each ￿rm is one dimensional (its
cost), virtual valuations depend on the cost parameters of all other ￿rms. This captures nicely
the existence of externalities among buyers: how much money the seller can extract from ￿rm A
depends on the technology of ￿rm B, which captures together with other parameters how strong
of a competitor ￿rm B is. As in JHM (1996) and (2001) the type of the buyer that is indi⁄erent
between participating or not, is not exogenously given but depends on the range of the externalities.
This critical type of each agent determines how much money the seller can extract from the players.
Unlike JHM (1996) and (2001), in our model this type depends also on the actual mechanism that
the mechanism designer employs. The reason for this is the presence of general type-dependent
externalities. The characterization of the optimum then becomes intricate: given a mechanism
there is a vector of critical types; the amount of payments that the seller can extract from the
buyers depends on the vector of critical types therefore the mechanism depends not only on the
virtual valuations, but also on which is the critical type. All these are novel but important insights
which can have signi￿cant implications for the design of allocation mechanisms for multiple objects
such as the design of mechanisms for the allocation of time-slots for advertisements, landing slots
in airports and many others.
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